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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the financial crisis, a dizzying array of new tools were 
given to regulators to prevent the next disaster from happening, or at least 
from happening in quite as destabilizing a way. In addition to new capital 
requirements; agreed-upon leverage rules; new ratio requirements for the 
relationship between assets and both long-term and short-term funding; 
and different tools for overseeing the derivatives markets and the orderly 
resolution of large financial institutions, regulators also announced that 
there would be some softer initiatives. 
The most prominent of these has been the effort to make banks more 
ethical through government oversight. Often this has been characterized 
as an effort to change the culture of financial institutions, and frequently 
neither ethics nor culture has been well defined. 
Nonetheless, the new approach is a real departure. Overseeing ethics 
and culture represented a change of tack by regulators who used to focus 
above all else on bank balance sheets and credit risk—tangible, often 
mathematical exercises in accounting and risk mitigation. Regulating 
culture is different. It is amorphous, depends on industry cooperation, and 
has nothing to do with math.1 Make bankers act more ethically, regulators 
reasoned, and they would be less likely to cut corners, evade regulation, 
and destabilize their own or other institutions. 
As John C. Williams, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York (New York Fed), explained in 2018, capital and other regulations are 
a necessary component of financial oversight but “far from sufficient. The 
danger we face today is that people may conclude that the hardened 
defenses are enough, and other supervisory activities around culture, 
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conduct, and governance are superfluous.”2 For these reasons, Williams 
said, “We must stay vigilant around the ‘softer’ side of supervision. Strong 
culture and robust corporate governance are our first lines of defense.”3 
The New York Fed was a pioneer in emphasizing the importance of culture 
in regulating banks. Williams’s predecessor, William Dudley, made it a 
central feature of his approach to regulatory reform.4 
However, U.S. institutions have not been alone in their scrutiny of 
banking ethics. Australia convened a “Royal Commission into Misconduct 
in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry,” and in 
2018, it concluded that cultural change was essential. The Commission 
recommended that Australian regulators “build a supervisory program 
focused on building culture that will mitigate the risk of misconduct” as a 
component of their ordinary prudential supervision of banks.5 Europe has 
also signed on to the idea, urging banks to take a proactive role in 
implementing an ethical culture and warning them that regulators would 
be on the cultural case. As European Central Bank Supervisory Board 
Chair Danièle Nouy has observed, “[t]he people who manage a bank can 
shape the culture and behavior of the entire organization. That is why 
supervisors keep a close eye on who becomes a bank manager.”6 
International institutions have also gotten involved. After the 
financial crisis, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), in concert with the G20 and the Financial Stability 
Board, developed its “High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer 
Protection,” which included criteria for responsible business conduct.7 The 
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Financial Stability Board in 2018 also published a seventy-eight page 
paper on “Strengthening Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct 
Risk: A Toolkit for Firms and Supervisors.”8 The report identified 
seventeen such tools designed to realize three goals: changing the culture 
of banks, emphasizing the individual responsibility of bankers for 
wrongdoing, and addressing the problem of bankers who leave one bank 
under a cloud of suspicion and then find work at another bank, bringing 
suspect values along with them.9 Bank of England Governor and former 
Financial Stability Board Chair Mark Carney has called this last issue the 
“rolling bad apples” phenomenon and has decried it, among a myriad of 
other problems, as related to the ethics of financial institutions.10 
There is little doubt that culture matters for institutions—entities 
ranging from economics departments to soccer teams spend plenty of time 
thinking about the cultures they hope to foster—and that culture is also 
exceedingly hard to measure or define.11 Regulators now have had a 
decade since the financial crisis to operationalize their approach to guiding 
and improving the ethics and culture of the banks they oversee. 
Understanding what they have chosen to do makes it easier to assess the 
value of the effort to make cultural transformation an important part of a 
regulatory program. It also offers lessons to the broader world of public 
administration, where some agencies, such as environmental regulators,12 
have not made a culture of compliance a priority, while others—securities 
regulators come to mind—have tried to do more to make certain values 
stick.13 
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I. THE THEORY OF ETHICS REGULATION 
Ethics regulators have tried to improve the culture of banks largely 
by encouraging the banks themselves to take steps to improve their culture 
in the way regulators would like. Behind that encouragement, however, a 
range of initiatives can be found, ranging from bringing the banks together 
to consider the question—the convening power—to certifying that senior 
bankers are appropriate for the job—the credentialing power. A variety of 
initiatives involving more of an imposition than calling a meeting, but not 
quite as intrusive a regime as one requiring executive pre-approval, have 
also been adopted in the effort to improve bank cultures. 
There is a large array of activities that are or could be considered 
cultural regulation, and so some distinctions must be made. Some 
regulators include under “cultural change regulation” any binding rule 
designed to deter already illegal conduct or to broaden the number of 
bankers who can be held responsible for such conduct. These regulations 
are designed to address illegality in the hope that cultural change at the 
sanctioned institution will follow, but they could just as easily be 
characterized as standard enforcement against institutions or individuals 
with conflicts of interest or inadequate internal controls. It does not make 
sense to view anti-fraud enforcement as a new sort of regulation, rooted in 
driving cultural change, because financial regulators have been on the 
lookout for fraud for years. 
For example, a new Dutch ethics regulator has sanctioned bankers 
for forging signatures and misusing private information—conduct that 
would plainly be illegal in the past.14 Although the regulator appears to be 
new, the matters being policed are regulatory classics. 
Similarly, British regulators consider their Senior Manager and 
Certification regime to be an important component of their culture change 
efforts.15 But that regime makes senior managers responsible for 
wrongdoing by subordinates in other parts of the bank—an extension of a 
liability rule, even if it is one designed to incentivize senior managers to 
create a culture of compliance throughout the bank.16 But the cultural 
change is supposed to work by extending legal sanctions, which now apply 
both to the banker who broke the law and to the senior manager who was 
leading the bank when the banker broke the law.17 
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I also exclude risk management from efforts to change culture, 
though of course, a different risk management approach at a financial 
institution could affect the culture of the firm. For example, many 
American financial firms are now required to have risk management 
committees at the board level; this reform has been characterized by some 
as an effort to curb an overly risk-loving financial culture.18 But regulators 
have long scrutinized the risk management programs at banks. The board 
risk management committee initiative exemplifies this19 by creating a 
channel at the board level for a risk management tool consistent with the 
usual inclination of regulators to ensure that banks do not take dangerous 
risks. 
 
This sort of regulation does look different. As Cynthia Williams and 
her co-authors have discussed, the Dutch National Bank (DNB or De 
Nederlandsche Bank) has hired organizational psychologists to encourage 
the development of healthy bank cultures.20 The DNB has created a 
behavioral and culture unit within the supervisory group of the central 
bank and issued a white paper on the “supervision of behavior and 
culture.”21 The attention is soft; the DNB has expressed concern with the 
so-called “tone at the top” of the bank as a critical way to make firms take 
ethics seriously.22 And the DNB wants ethics to be more than a matter of 
“box ticking.”23 All of this is a form of emphasis rather than a specific set 
of requirements that might look to outside observers like regulation itself. 
Regulatory strategies for obtaining cultural change can be placed 
along a spectrum—a rough one, with plenty of regulatory initiatives that 
touch on different parts of the spectrum at the same time—of softer to 
harder measures.24 The lowest key approach to cultural improvement 
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comes when regulators use their convening power to require firms to think 
about ethics. There is a component of information exchange involved in 
this process, as well as an implicit threat of enforcement if culture 
conferences produce no results. But the central idea is an invitation to 
reflect on self-regulation, if you like. The New York Fed has regularly 
deployed its convener powers at conference on banking ethics; it is the 
form of regulation that most heavily relies on industry to take the lead in 
attending to culture.25 
This sort of best practices and benchmarking-style governance can 
be further institutionalized. For example, the British Banking Standards 
Board and American self-regulatory organization FINRA, both industry-
created institutions, have turned to such practices—the board through an 
annual survey and FINRA through a variety of measures ranging from a 
convening power to enforcement.26 
Another popular approach—if quite strange—to improving culture is 
the ascent of the oath in which regulators or industry require or encourage 
members to swear to uphold a number of broad principles. Sometimes, as 
in the case of the Netherlands, this oath can serve as a basis for 
enforcement if broken.27 
More onerous still is the information exchange that some regulators 
call for, especially when it involves a requirement that the work histories 
of bankers and other industry professionals be made available to the public 
or scrutinized by firms before they can hire the banker. Such measures are 
designed to prevent unethical bankers, forced out of their current banks 
but not out of the industry, from spreading their practices to other 
institutions.28 
The most stringent—at least potentially—“soft” requirement 
requires the pre-approval of the regulator before the banker can begin 
working in the profession. The U.K. has created such a regime for senior 
managers of its financial institutions.29 This gatekeeping role in some ways 
changes what bank regulators do. Rather than enforcing rules against 
unethical or illegal bankers, like a law enforcement agency, certification 
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turns a financial regulator into a gatekeeper, like the Food & Drug 
Administration, whose approval determines whether prescription drugs 
can be sold.30 
In what follows, this Article offers examples of these new initiatives, 
ranging from softer to harder and again, with some such regimes hitting 
more than one of the stations of the cross. 
But first, some caveats. There are reasons to doubt that ethics 
regulation can work. Changing culture, an organic thing, from the outside 
is something that anthropologists have long deemed challenging.31 The 
goals that financial regulators seem to want to achieve through ethics 
regulation—putting the interests of the customer first and getting banks to 
act like a semi-private provider of a public service—would turn part of 
banking regulation into a professional responsibility regime—the kind that 
doctors, lawyers, and accountants all labor under. But financial institutions 
only partly fit the professional model.32 Some of their employees provide 
advice, like lawyers, but others are nothing more than salesmen of money. 
Financial intermediation is a public good deeply entwined with state 
finance, but bankers are not officers of the court or the first line of defense 
against an epidemic, like lawyers or doctors, and it is not clear that they 
should be treated in the same way.33 
Viewed most pessimistically, the turn to culture and ethics can look 
like a sign that regulators have given up on the hard work of making smart 
financial types comply with rules they would just as soon not follow and 
are now seeking the help of frequently noncompliant industry to do it. In 
turn, this can look like greenwashing34—banks are distrusted and 
unpopular, and loud proclamations that their overseers are going to ensure 
that they act in a principled, ethical way going forward might turn out to 
be good for their image. 
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II. THE NEW TOOLS USED TO IMPLEMENT CULTURAL REFORM 
A. The Convening Power of Regulators 
In what probably constitutes ethics regulation’s lightest touch, the 
banking regulators have tried to get financial institutions to self-regulate 
on ethics through nothing more than emphasis through speeches and 
meetings. For instance, in 2018, Executive Vice President of the New 
York Fed Kevin Stiroh addressed some ways to address ethical failures in 
the banking culture. He recommended “engaging with diverse 
thinkers . . . to better understand the complexity of culture reform” and 
“facilitating discussions among the supervisory community on assessing 
and influencing industry culture-related efforts.”35 These could be 
supplemented, in his view, with conferences and workshops among 
academic experts and regulatory and industry representatives on culture 
reform. They could also be supplemented by building a relationship 
between business schools to train future financial market professionals in 
good culture and writing about the issue in white papers and the like.36 
These sorts of conferences and meetings have become, if anything, 
standard tropes of ethical compliance. The New York Fed has held a 
number of high-level, two-day meetings with executives at large banks at 
which it pushed them to establish a “culture of compliance” with an ethical 
tone from management.37 William Dudley, the former president of the 
New York Fed, and a particular proponent of improving the culture in 
banks, thought that “career progression is as important as 
compensation. . . . The key point is that firms need to take a hard look at 
how they reward employees.”38 To Dudley, the right incentives could be 
realized through bonus calculations, which could be tied to law-
abidingness as well as productivity.39 
                                                     
 35. Kevin J. Stiroh, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve of N.Y., Remarks at the 4th Annual 
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 36. Id. 
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https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/governance-and-culture-reform/2018-NewYork 
Fed-Culture-Conference-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/78ZZ-RVKU]. 
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Speech at Federal Reserve Bank of New York: Strengthening Culture for the Long Term 3–4 (June 
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 39. Id. See generally Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670 
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employees with incentives to take inappropriate risks that are not consistent with the long-term health 
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In the U.K., such conferences have become annual affairs, with 
regulators and consumer advocates making the case at conferences of bank 
executives.40 
The goal is modest. By making ethics part of the agenda of meetings 
involving both regulators and senior bankers, the regulators are 
emphasizing that they take ethics seriously. The meetings can always be 
supplemented with action later—former New York Fed President William 
Dudley warned at one conference that if bank managers “as stewards of 
these large financial institutions do not do [their] part in pushing forcefully 
for change across the industry, then bad behavior will undoubtedly 
persist. . . . In that case, financial stability concerns would dictate that 
[their] firms need to be dramatically downsized and simplified. . . .”41 By 
exploring new approaches at these meetings—including some of the ways 
discussed later in this chapter—regulators can encourage self-regulation 
by industry. It is an approach that encourages financial institutions to 
address ethics without requiring anything of them except attendance and 
consideration, ideally followed by some internally generated reforms. 
B. Best Practices and Benchmarking by Industry 
More taxing than discussing best practices at industry meetings are 
regulatory requirements that industries develop such best practices. 
Regulators interested in improving the culture of the banks they oversee 
have often required this sort of best practices development, and now, 
invitations to devise best practices have become common to the 
burgeoning field of culture and ethics.42 In theory, identifying best 
                                                     
of the institution and, in turn, the long-term health of the U.S. economy”); EUROPEAN BANKING 
AUTH., GUIDELINES ON SOUND REMUNERATION POLICIES 33 (2015), https://eba.europa.eu/ 
documents/10180/1314839/EBA-GL-2015-22+Guidelines+on+Sound+Remuneration+Policies.pdf/1 
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joined this effort: “[A]ssess the mechanisms and systems adopted to ensure that the remuneration 
system properly takes into account all types of risks, liquidity and capital levels and that the overall 
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the institution”). 
 40. See Gillian Guy, Chief Exec., Citizens Advice, Remarks at Financial Times Banking 
Standards Conference: Improving the Professional and Ethical Conduct of Bankers—A Consumer 
Perspective (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/improving-the-professional-
and-ethical-conduct-of-bankers-a-consumer-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/D9MZ-EXBY]. 
 41. William C. Dudley, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks 
at the Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Enhancing 
Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry (Oct. 20, 2014), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2014/dud141020a.html [https://perma.cc/M4U4-
AZVY]. 
 42. For a discussion of best practices as a regulatory tool, see David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 297 (2006) (“In a classic best practices scheme, regulated entities themselves 
devise practices to comply with relatively unspecific regulatory requirements.”). 
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practices can encourage firms to move towards the benchmark, after which 
new best practices can be identified, and the process can iterate onward.43 
However, as this sort of regulation is not mandatory, progress is by no 
means assured. 
1. The U.K.’s Banking Standards Board 
The U.K. has sought to identify the best practices for banking culture 
by tasking industry with the creation of an institution to study the question 
and to regularly survey bankers to assess how they view the culture at their 
employers. 
In June 2013, the U.K. Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards published a report titled “Changing Banking for Good.”44 One 
change proposed creating a “professional body for banking in the U.K.”45 
In 2015, the banks responded by creating the Banking Standards Board.46 
The board is a non-governmental entity funded by its members47 that 
                                                     
 43. Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 763, 
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44.  
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setting process, lessons to be learned about corporate governance, transparency and 
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/03/banking-standards-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X22-K6HQ]. 
 46. What Is the BSB?, BANKING STANDARDS BD., http://www.bankingstandards 
board.org.uk/what-is-the-bsb/ [https://perma.cc/DYP7-WNVU]. For a discussion of the Libor 
manipulation crisis and the cultural conditions existing prior to the proposal of the BSB, see Justin 
O’Brien, Culture Wars: Rate Manipulation, Institutional Corruption, and the Lost Normative 
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promotes best practices and encourages the exchange of information. Both 
turn on its annual assessment, designed to provide insight to its member 
banks into the current status of culture in the U.K. banking industry.48 The 
assessment invites employees to evaluate how their firms fare on nine 
characteristics: openness, reliability, honesty, competence, 
responsiveness, organizational resilience, respect, accountability, and 
shared purpose.49 The assessment is designed with the assistance of 
academics and also includes a quantitative element. It is based on a thirty-
four question employee survey, from which the scores on the nine 
characteristics come.50 The board also evaluates these characteristics 
qualitatively through focus groups and interviews.51 The results are 
aggregated at both the firm level and for all BSB members collectively so 
that individual members are able to compare their performance to that of 
other member banks, although many of these results are not shared with 
the public.52 
The board’s annual review and discussion of its assessment is more 
public and describes the results of the survey on an aggregate basis. While 
the 2017 survey results showed an improvement in culture as compared to 
2016, the 2018 survey showed a slowing of improvements (as measured 
based on the results of the assessment in aggregate).53 The board model 
has had its share of cross-border appeal. In December 2017, the five largest 
retail banks in Ireland announced plans to establish their own board, the 
Irish Banking Culture Board.54 The board launched on April 15, 2019, and 
will also conduct an annual survey on the state of banking culture in that 
country. In America, Stiroh, the New York Fed official, has praised the 
board as an institution that can, given the importance of “cultural capital,” 
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 49. Id. at 13. 
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 51. Assessment Results 2018, BANKING STANDARDS BD., https://www.bankingstandardsboard. 
org.uk/assessment-results-2018/ [https://perma.cc/SKS5-CXUQ]. 
 52. Assessment Results 2017, BANKING STANDARDS BD., https://www.bankingstandardsboard. 
org.uk/assessment-results-2017/ [https://perma.cc/F4KT-MSYP]. 
 53. Id. 
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provide insight into practices that banks can adopt to improve that 
capital.55 
2. FINRA’s Efforts to Promote Ethics in the Financial Industry 
The U.S. has its own long extant self-regulatory organization (SRO), 
and that organization has also adopted the idea of taking ethics seriously. 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has developed a 
reporting requirement, has played a role as an ethics convener, and has 
policed ethics as a traditional enforcer; the efforts fall in different parts of 
our continuum of intensity of regulation, but one of those initiatives has 
required surveys of its membership, as with the BSB, in an effort to 
understand what works to improve culture and to convey that information 
to the industry. FINRA developed the BrokerCheck database and thus has 
tried to develop a user-friendly way to offer clients information about their 
brokers and investment advisers, including information about prior 
disciplinary proceedings. BrokerCheck was first introduced in 1998, 
making FINRA a relatively early adopter of one approach banking 
regulators have highlighted to deal with the rolling bad apples problem.56 
Today, BrokerCheck includes information about nearly 630,000 registered 
representatives and 3,600 securities firms across the United States.57 
Like the U.K.’s Banking Standards Board, FINRA has also sought to 
provide its members with information about best practices, even though it 
has not, so far, tried to do so via a comprehensive, repeated survey of 
financial professionals. FINRA has, however, offered its members 
guidance on establishing, communicating, and implementing cultural 
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values,58 and it has held a conference on building and maintaining an 
ethical culture.59 
FINRA has always played an important role in sanctioning industry 
professionals who run afoul of its rules, and here too, it has tried to use the 
language of ethical improvement in its enforcement. Between 2014 and 
2018, FINRA filed over 6,000 disciplinary actions, including expelling 
over 100 firms and barring over 2,000 individuals from the industry.60 As 
we have seen, when it comes to enforcement actions, much of what gets 
labeled as ethics enforcement looks like the kind of enforcement that 
would be done even if regulators never spoke about ethics or culture. But 
FINRA is different, if only a little, because of how explicitly it has 
highlighted its goals of cultural improvement and its long tenure as a 
policer of ethics-like conflicts of interest and consumer protections. 
FINRA indicated in 2016 that one of its enforcement priorities would 
be to determine how firms would “establish, communicate and implement 
cultural values, and [determine] whether cultural values are guiding 
business conduct.”61 It sanctioned a number of compliance officers at 
firms for failing to adequately police or deter misconduct during this 
period, which some in the industry took as evidence of an effort to improve 
the compliance culture at firms.62 
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Moreover, many FINRA actions have been brought under its 
longstanding Rule 2010, which provides that a FINRA “member, in the 
conduct of its business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor 
and just and equitable principles of trade”—a standard fairly brimming 
with concern about culture.63 The organization’s own appellate body has 
characterized Rule 2010 as “a broad and generalized ethical 
provision . . . sufficiently wide to encompass any unethical, business-
related conduct.”64 In fact, Rule 2010 is the most commonly invoked 
FINRA rule and allows the regulator to “capture conduct that cannot be 
efficiently or easily proved to violate another rule but that FINRA believes 
is worthy of sanction.”65 FINRA has used the rule to sanction individuals 
who made material misrepresentations and omissions in a company’s 
public filings,66 a company that altered customer-related information after 
the customer complained about the suitability of a recommendation,67 and 
a firm that failed to maintain the required minimum net capital required by 
the Securities Exchange Act.68 
These cases, like many enforcement cases, fall into the category of 
being sanctionable for failing to meet high standards of “commercial 
honor,” but also for failing to meet straightforward conflict of interest and 
lack of internal controls standards. According to FINRA’s Sanction 
Guidelines, Rule 2010 remedies are to be deployed to protect the investing 
public by deterring misconduct and upholding high standards of business 
conduct; to be more severe for recidivists; and to be applied with 
consideration of sanctions imposed by other regulators or previous 
corrective action imposed by a firm based on similar conduct.69  
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FINRA has found the scope of its cultural enforcement program to 
be hard to define, which has led to industry complaints about 
unpredictability. Some observers have concluded that the organization’s 
2018 enforcement priorities letter “may signal a shift in FINRA priorities 
to more tangible areas for enforcement moving forward, perhaps in 
response to the feedback that many found the agency’s requirements 
related to ‘culture’ difficult to quantify, and therefore difficult to manage 
toward.”70 The SRO has since devoted more efforts to identifying rolling 
bad apples, consistent with the priorities of banking regulators in other 
contexts.71 
C. Oaths 
Other regulators have tried to change the values of financial 
institutions by making them swear allegiance to particular ethical 
principles and, in the case of the Dutch in particular, to hold them to 
account if they fail to follow those principles. 
The Dutch Banking Association requires all Dutch bankers to swear 
an oath.72 All 90,000 bankers working in the Netherlands were required to 
adopt the oath by the start of 2015.73 The oath consists of eight “integrity 
vows,” including a commitment by each banker that they will know their 
“responsibility to society” and that they “will make every effort to improve 
and retain trust in the financial sector.”74 The oath concludes with a 
requirement that the banker appeal to a deity or make a solemn promise: 
“So help me God! This I pledge and promise!”75 
The Dutch Banker’s Oath is subject to enforcement, ranging from 
reprimands, to fines that max out at €25,000, to a three-year maximum 
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moratorium on working anywhere in the Dutch banking industry.76 
Enforcement matters are heard by the Foundation for Banking Ethics 
Enforcement (in Dutch, the “Stichting Tuchtrecht Banken”), which was 
set up in 2015.77 Since then, the entity has indeed considered some 
enforcement measures—thirty such matters in the two years since its 
founding, ten of which involved the forging of customer signatures, and 
four involving the unwarranted review of customer data.78 In most of these 
cases, the regulator handed down industry bans lasting between six to 
twenty-four months, depending on the case and misconduct in question. 
Although the Dutch Banker’s Oath is perhaps the best known and 
most widely applied oath rolled out in the wake of the financial crisis, it is 
not alone. An Australian nonprofit devised a simple oath that bankers 
could voluntarily take; it also consists of a list of commitments, including 
commitments to “serve all interests in good faith” and to “pursue my ends 
with ethical restraint.”79 Oath takers are listed on a public website; over 
1,000 Australian bankers have signed on, though that comprises a small 
proportion of the Australians employed by the country’s banking 
industry.80 Japan Financial Services Authority employees have been 
reminded that they are expected to operate “for the sake of the nation and 
its people” and to “meet the expectations of the people.”81 The British 
banking industry also considered, but ultimately decided against, requiring 
bankers to take an oath.82 In the U.S., the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency requires bank directors to affirm that they will “diligently and 
honestly administer the affairs of such association, and will not knowingly 
violate or willingly permit to be violated any of the provisions.”83 
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These oaths appear to be signaling devices, which are designed to 
remind bankers of their responsibilities. Enforcement actions citing any of 
the oaths as an underlying basis have been rare outside of Holland—and 
apparently nonexistent in Australia, if the voluntary oath could even serve 
as the basis for discipline.84 
D. Using Information Against Bad Apples 
Regulators have worried that bankers adept at circumventing rules 
might be asked to leave their bank, but not the industry. Creating a 
database—a blacklist, of sorts—of bankers who have engaged in 
misconduct, and forcing banks to consult the database before hiring the 
banker, is one way to improve a culture of compliance by making it more 
difficult for noncompliers to remain employed in the industry. 
 
Former New York Fed president Dudley thought that there might be 
some merit to to the blacklist.85 Dudley urged the creation of “a database 
of banker misconduct to combat the problem of ‘rolling bad apples.’”86 
The effort to develop such a database has been one of the most common 
cultural reform efforts taken on by regulators since the financial crisis.87 
Developing such a database draws on some tools that regulators, who 
often must disclose at least some of their enforcement actions to the public, 
have long had. Many financial regulators have thus created reviewable 
lists of former industry members subject to industry bars, if not always in 
as convenient a format as BrokerCheck. The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regularly sanctions securities fraudsters with 
temporary or even permanent bans from the securities industry: it imposed 
625 bars and suspensions of wrongdoers in fiscal year 2017 and over 650 
bars and suspensions in fiscal year 2016, either permanently or for a period 
of time.88 
The self-regulatory organization’s list of disciplined brokers and 
dealers is not entirely publicly available, but it is reviewable by firms and 
regulators that are granted access by FINRA, and members of the public 
                                                     
 84. Myer, supra note 80. 
 85. See William C. Dudley, Former President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: The Importance of Incentives in Ensuring a Resilient and 
Robust Financial System (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches 
/2018/dud180326 [https://perma.cc/6LJ6-ZJZF]. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See generally David Zaring, The International Campaign to Create Ethical Bankers, 3 J. FIN. 
REG. 187 (2017). 
 88. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T, ANNUAL REPORT: A LOOK BACK AT FISCAL 
YEAR 2017, at 12, https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EM56-VNBP]. 
572 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:555 
can inspect parts of it, including the parts with the involuntary termination 
records—through the BrokerCheck portal.89 FINRA has also compiled a 
database of registered investment professionals who have passed FINRA’s 
qualification standards.90 The database includes “registration records of 
broker-dealer firms and their associated individuals including their 
qualification, employment and disclosure histories.”91 Firms are obligated 
to upload forms to the database whenever they terminate an employee; in 
the forms, they must describe the reasons for the separation.92 The 
database of individuals and firms can be accessed by members of the 
public, who can view their broker’s disclosure history, including 
regulatory and involuntary termination actions, number and type of 
securities licensing exams passed, and years of experience.93 
Other jurisdictions have implemented blacklists of bankers in the 
wake of the financial crisis. As Bank of England Governor Carney 
observed, Britain’s Prudential Review Authority “has introduced 
requirements for regulated firms to provide employment references to one 
another in a mandatory template when hiring Senior Managers. This 
includes information on an individual’s conduct record, and their fitness 
and propriety.”94 The Dutch—trendsetters when it comes to regulating the 
ethics of bankers—also have a blacklist.95 
Globally, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has made 
recommendations as to how to implement a blacklist on the assumption 
that the regulator may not have the power or desire to require it, but that 
industry might adopt it of its own accord.96 In its toolkit on “Strengthening 
Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct Risk,” the FSB 
                                                     
 89. About BrokerCheck, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/investors/learn-to-invest/choosing-
investment-professional/about-brokercheck [https://perma.cc/D9VV-ENYU]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Central Registration Depository (CRD), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/crd [https:// 
perma.cc/34Y6-Z4PB]. 
 92. See About BrokerCheck, supra note 89. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Remarks at the Banking Standards Board Panel: 




 95. See generally First Measure by Disciplinary Commission for Dutch Banks: What Lies 
Ahead?, CLIFFORD CHANCE BRIEFINGS, Dec. 2016, at 1, https://www.cliffordchance.com/content 
/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2016/12/first-measure-by-disciplinary-commission-for-dutch-banks-
what-lies-ahead.pdf [https://perma.cc/S27Z-TPRC] (as this memo of the early work of the disciplinary 
body in charge of applying the Dutch ethical code indicates: “Instead of the maximum term it has 
imposed a 6 month disqualification from the profession, as the bank had already terminated 
employment and blacklisted the employee”). 
 96. See STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS TO MITIGATE MISCONDUCT RISK, supra 
note 8. 
2020] Regulating Banking Ethics 573 
developed five tools for firms and two tools for regulators, all designed to 
deal with the problems created when unloved bankers find new homes.97 
The recommendations tend, as international financial regulatory 
recommendations often do, toward the banal. Firms are supposed to 
communicate their conduct expectations consistently; enhance their 
interviewing techniques; do thorough reviews of bankers before hiring; 
reassess employee conduct regularly; and conduct exit reviews when 
employees are encouraged to leave the bank.98 It is difficult to know who 
would pound the table against such initiatives, at least in public. 
Nor are the recommendations for national authorities and supervisors 
more specific. They are instructed to supervise firm employment screening 
practices and to “[p]romote compliance with legal or regulatory 
requirements regarding conduct-related information about applicable 
employees, where these exist.”99 The latter recommendation is supposed 
to ensure that where it is possible to manage a blacklist, consistent with 
privacy, due process, and employment laws, supervisors should try to do 
it. 
These are modest, even bland sorts of counsel, but they do reflect the 
priorities of leading bank supervisors. The FSB did not have to emphasize 
culture, and yet it took stock of cultural regulation in 2017 in a white paper 
and devised the toolkit one year later, suggesting that it thought the 
encouragement of a global body on culture might help.100 
More generally, the recommendations exemplify the trust that 
regulators can put on industry reporting. On the principle that reporting 
can induce compliance, another implementation mechanism that has been 
weighed by regulators is to require disclosure about ethics in culture in the 
reports of publicly traded companies.101 As the U.K. banker David Walker 
has put it, “[T]here is need for enhanced narrative reporting on culture. 
This should be substantive, outlining fully the values set by the board with 
an assessment of progress, presented with the same seriousness as the hard 
numbers in financial reporting.”102 American banking regulators have 
made the promulgation of a code of ethics something that weighs on their 
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assessment of the quality of the management of the bank, which, if not 
exactly encouraging reporting, encourages a degree of promulgation.103 
E. Certification 
One of the most stringent ways to ensure that financial institutions 
are managed by people with appropriate qualifications and of good 
character is to require firms to certify this, and for regulators to approve 
the certification. The requirement changes the role of the financial 
regulator from an ex post enforcer of regulations to an ex ante gatekeeper 
like the Food and Drug Administration, which must establish, to its 
satisfaction, that any new drug is “safe and effective.”104 Senior manager 
certification has become an important part of the U.K.’s post-crisis 
regulatory reforms; the pre-approval it requires from regulators has the 
potential to seriously constrain firms as to whom they might hire.105 
The U.K.’s Parliamentary Commission for Banking Standards 
adopted a new Senior Manager and Certification Regime (SM&CR) on 
March 7, 2016.106 The aim of the regime is to “reduce harm to consumers 
and strengthen market integrity by making individuals more accountable 
for their conduct and competence” by holding senior managers 
accountable for misconduct by lower level officials, requiring pre-
approval of important bank managers by the U.K.’s financial regulators, 
and applying a new set of conduct rules to all.107 
Parliament passed laws adopting the regime in 2013 and 2016 in 
amendments to the main U.K. financial services legislation, the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000.108 SM&CR was rolled out in March 2016 
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and was extended to all Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)-regulated 
financial services firms on December 9, 2019.109 
The pre-approval process means that senior managers at the financial 
institution must be assessed by their firms as “fit and proper,” and they 
must be approved by the Financial Conduct Authority on an annual 
basis.110 A fit and proper manager is one who “has obtained a qualification; 
has undergone, or is undergoing, training; or possesses a level of 
competence; or has the personal characteristics; required by the general 
rules made by the FCA.”111 Other financial professionals who have a 
“significant impact on customers, the firm and/or market integrity” must 
also be certified.112 This group includes proprietary traders; client-facing 
advice-givers, such as financial advisers and investment managers; 
material risk-takers; and those with responsibility for approving the 
deployment of algorithmic trading strategies.113 The FCA’s pre-approval 
standard—the fit and proper standard—has been characterized by British 
regulators as an ethics regulation because it not only looks to the 
professional qualifications of the senior managers and key employees of 
financial institutions, but also because it allows for an evaluation of 
bankers based on their character.114 
Less clearly, “ethical” is the requirement that senior managers 
prepare a “Statement of Responsibilities” that “must clearly describe all of 
the[] responsibilities” for which the senior manager is responsible and 
accountable.115 They are also subject to a “Duty of Responsibility,” which 
allows the FCA to hold the manager responsible when the firm breaches 
one of the FCA’s requirements upon a showing that the senior manager 
did not take reasonable steps to prevent or stop the breach.116 This regime 
was created partly from a sense that senior managers were not penalized 
for wrongdoing elsewhere in their banks during the financial crisis, but it 
should probably be understood as a liability rule expanding responsibility 
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for illegality beyond the bankers most closely associated with the illegal 
conduct. 
The conduct rules are a mixture of both liability and ethics rules. The 
rules apply to all employees within a firm, not just those certified by the 
firm and the FCA (though senior managers get their own set of rules).117 
The purpose of the conduct rules is to “shape the culture, standards and 
policies of firms as a whole and promote positive behaviors that reduce 
harm.”118 The rules seem designed to reach matters that might be 
considered ethics-related, especially those that apply to street-level 
professionals. Those rules include acting with integrity; acting with due 
care, skill, and diligence; being open and cooperative with regulators; 
paying due regard to the interest of customers and treating them fairly; and 
observing the proper standards of market conduct.119 Senior manager 
conduct rules include ensuring that the business is controlled effectively 
and complying with relevant requirements; that delegated responsibilities 
are discharged effectively; and that the FCA or Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA) is notified of any relevant information.120 
The FCA’s Enforcement and Annual Performance Report 2017–
2018 recounts forty-eight culture and governance cases opened between 
April 1, 2017, and March 31, 2018, while only two cases were closed.121 
As of the publication of the report in 2018, there were sixty-one culture 
and governance cases open, compared to fifteen the previous year.122 The 
highest profile of these cases involved Jes Staley, the CEO of Barclays, 
who was fined by the FCA and PRA jointly for failing to act with “due 
skill, care and diligence” in attempting to identify the author of two 
anonymous letters that disparaged a friend and colleague.123 The FCA 
reasoned that Staley should have recognized a conflict of interest between 
his desire to protect his friend and the best interest of the bank he led, 
which benefits from information provided by whistleblowers. Staley was 
assessed ten percent of his annual income as penalty.124 
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Staley’s penalty is related to culture improvement, which at banks 
has often involved supporting whistleblowers, but the retaliation, while 
not the ordinary fraud now policed by the new Dutch ethics regulator, 
might have been sanctionable under the pre-SC&R regime. That regime, 
with its code of conduct, its extended responsibility, and above all, its pre-
approval process, has gone far into making ethical conduct a requirement 
of banking. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the most interesting developments of the regulatory response 
to the financial crisis has been the turn by regulators toward initiatives to 
improve the ethics of the financial industry in a way that makes the 
industry culturally more likely to comply with regulatory rules and avoid 
taking on excessive risks. It is by no means clear that the effort to regulate 
ethics will work, but what is clear is that regulators have made ethics a 
priority such that they have turned to a number of different strategies to 
operationalize a concept that has always risked being amorphous and 
un-operationalizable. 
 
